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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
STRU·CTURAL 'STEEL & 
FORGE CO., a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 8785 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
'STATEMENT OF POINITS 
POIN'T I. 
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED 
STATE'S CONSTITU'TION DOES NOT CREA'TE CON-
CURREN'T JURISDI1CTIO·N IN THE INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE COMMISSION OVER THESE CASES. 
POIN'T II. 
THE IN'TERS'TATE ·CO·MMERCE COMMISSION 
HA'S NO 'JURISDI-C'TION OVER ,THE APPE,LLANT. 
POIN'T III. 
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMIS'SIO·N 
DOE1S NOT HAVE PRIMARY JURISDIICTION OVER 
THE SUBJECT MA'TTER. 
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POINT IV. 
REFERRAL TO 'THE INTER'S'TATE C'OMMERCE 
COMMISSION IS BARRED BY 'THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
POIN'T V . 
.ft~SSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE IN'TERSTATE 
COMMER,CE COMMIBSrON DOES HAVE EXCLUSIVE 
PRIMARY JURISDIC'TION, THEN THE 'TRIAL ·COURT 
SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED 'THESE CASES. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Respondent in its brief has raised new matter 
to which this reply brief is addressed. 
POINT I. 
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED 
STATE'S CONSTITUTION DOES NOT CREATE CON-
C'URRENT JURISDICTION IN THE INTER~TATE 
C·OMMERCE COMMISSION OVER THESE CASES. 
Appellant contends that before one even considers 
whether the subject matter of these cases comes 
within the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it must 
be shown that the administrative agency has juris-
diction over the parties concurrent with that of the 
court which would make the referral. 
The Railroad concedes that there is no statute 
allowing it to initiate an original proceeding in 
these cases 'before the Interstate Comn1erce Com-
mission ( Respdt's br. p. 18) but it seems to find 
concurrent jurisdiction in the Interstate Commerce 
Commission merely because these cases involve 
questions dealing with interstate commerce 
(Respdt's br. p. 16). The Railroad contends that the 
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source of the original state court jurisdiction in 
these cases is not the state Constitution, but is cre-
ated through the beneficence of ~gress in it,s 
exclusive right to regulate interstate commerce. 
. .. . , . .. -·.- :-- .. · ~····-'- ---.-, -..... ·-- -.-. .-. - - -' ·"" ··- ·-·:--'~·:- :·.~--:.. .. . ••-.::":".-· ·."·'··~~ .... ; ; .. · !·- -· -···-~~ - tr IJ !5!1:ii., _ P.!IISR~~·~ -- -- ' . ·.:. - ·.c· ·.-· ·.'". "<.. 
(Re-spdt's br. p. 29). ~ For_thJ.~ ,r~~§on ,,1h~~RIDJr.9e~ 
contend~ __ tha.t _jurisdiction __ of the Interstate Com-
.JJ2flll!lh~4.~~::~ - ·{: t ;l·:.:· '·=-i-'•;:~~-::s.¢.~ ........ ,. _ -~- .-: :<;..;.;-:;- .~:~:~/~ .. ::<tf~7 .. ~-t.:,; · _~~~·.::~-·y;,.·::-:·1 · ~!~,.: ~-;;-;::·:~ .{ 
n1erce ComiJiission .. J~-- _!1Qt only "primary" l>,~t _ "_e~::-
~-- * - ~ --- O -- ..r~·- :JII! .... _ _ __ • ..,...,.; . ~ =:: - · · · - ~ ·- ..: .· -•:-- ·. ·•:~ -: .;..:'='•"·~·"•·-~ ~--::=: ::,.·._:h::;~t::~if'' •'· '"'r-'.:!t=E'~ ·-.:-· · · ·- -- · ··•· :·: . · - '. ':''· :l"~'.-,i.•'::'' j..;~ · ~-~- :;:· ..... _'<,\ -.-"':::~ . :·: • 
~!~!~~:-~~<J~~~~pdt'.~:.J~.:r~ , p . .. !§};,,":,!his position is un-
derstandable, because the Railroad recognizes it 
must find a jurisdictional basis for the Interstate 
Commerce Commission to act in a case of this nature. 
'The Railroad's argument on this point seems to 
be tl1at it could have, if it had wished, commenced 
these proceedings against defendant before the In-
terstate Commerce Commission, although it concedes 
there is no statute authorizing this, because of the 
bare bones of the commerce clause. 
This contention is just not the law, as an ele-
mental analysis of the workings of the Federal-
State system will show. ·These are a·ctions for money 
due under contracts of carriage. Such actions from 
time immemorial can be brought wherever the plain-
tiff can successfully obtain jurisdiction over defen-
dant. In this case plaintiff succeeded in obtaining 
jurisdiction over the defendant in the state courts 
of Utah. The Interstate 'Commerce Act made no 
change at all in this state of affairs. In fact Sec-
tion 22 of that Act expressly provided that nothing 
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in the Act would abridge or alter rights then exist-
ing in common law. Certainly the Railroad cannot 
contend that the commerce clause of the United 
States Constitution vests in the Interstate Com-
merce Commission concurrent jurisdiction with the 
State or Federal court of all matters merely because 
they involve interstate commerce. This argument 
'If£"?# . Si ;GL I:E ! 
J;educed to absurdity would vest in ihe CJ>mmissiQD 
COfl:~~,~~~rit jurisdiction to de~~rmj~~ ... [ights in_j !1~--
Jp.&,_~~':--/-- ,.,_,~.'.!.:.,1.~~-._~~~c~~ -·- ., -~~ ~-~!J9A_ u ._.J;4ilti;: :sa. 
tions involving collisions of motor veh-icles which 
are interstate carriers. It is true that the federal 
~-:;-·.···~ :wu "\: judiciary has by development of the concept of pri-
mary jurisdiction limited the rights of all courts 
'(State and Federal) in certain cases involving cer-
tain issues to decide these without prior recourse 
to the Interstate Commerce Commission- but this 
is a far ·different thing from contending that the 
Interstate Commerce Act created a right in the 
state courts. 
Merely to restate the common law development 
of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not 
solve the question before this court, because these 
questions are: ( 1) Do these cases involve the issues 
generally considered su:bject to referral to the In-
terstate Commerce Commission? (2) Even if such 
issues are present, can such a referral 'be made where 
the Interstate Commerce Commission has no juris-
diction over the party objecting to the referral? 
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'Stated differently, does the Interstate Com-
merce Commission have primary jurisdiction over 
the subject matter involved here, and if so, does it 
have jurisdiction over the persons? 
POIN'T II. 
THE IN'TERSTATE ·COMMERCE C'OMMISSION 
HAS NO JURISDI·C'TION OVER 'THE APPE'LLANT. 
Respondent contends that if Congress merely 
repealed Section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 
Congress would "completely remove concurrent jur-
isdiction from state coutts in the field of interstate 
commerce" (Respdt's br. p. 30) 'T·he matter is cer-
tainly not that simple. Respondent· cites P.ennsyl-
vania R. Co. v. PuritJaxn Coal Min. Co., 23'7 U'S 121, 
130, 35 Sup. ·ct. 484, '59 L. Ed 867 ( 1915), where the 
United States ·Supreme Court, in discussing Section 
22, stated that without this section '·'it might have 
~-
been claimed ~?~~~,_2.2pgress having entei"e!! the fi~ld, 
tlie \vh'ole subject of liability of carrier to shippers 
--- ~-------' - ---' ' -- '-'' '"'"''· -~-~" ---~~-- ,. _______ ,.,_ .,.,. -
in interstii'te" commerce had been withdrawn from 
"-- . . ·- ._ .. _..-,.-.. """"" .. ~r- IIMi ,_ ~ 
tfie ___ Jtrrisdictiol1~of~·tne state '"c6Urts, and this clause 
~ . llfDD ~~ R :,t·~ ~ "' V'~··t,•.~l'(.'P"- '""" liU-.'$. 
was added to indicate that the commerce act, in 
'~ _.. ''--"' "" lillil! .101 -· - ~;ali- "' .• .. ,.·,.~···'1~~7Y~ >-.- • 
giving rights of action in Federa~ courts was not in-
~ 81i!~~:-~W"f~ ·.:.-... ~~~.;: 
tended to deprive the state courts of their general 
-·- '' ~ --· 
and concurrent jurisdiction." (emphasis added~irst, 
• I • • ~~)1/1 
of course Puritan ·Coal was an action where the 
state cou;t was held to have properly exercised its 
juridiction in not referring. Secondly it was an ac-
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tion brought by a shipper against a carrier. The 
problem was whether, when Section 9 of the Act 
expressly gave the shipper alternative remedies to 
bring such an action ·before either the Commission 
or a federal court, the shipper could choose a third 
alternative (i.e. the state courts). The Supreme 
Court said that by reason of Section 2·2 it could. 
There Section 9 and Section 2'2 construed together 
were held to have preserved the jurisdiction of the 
state court. 
But the Act is completely silent about claims 
by carrier against the shipper. In such a case Sec-
tion 22 clearly indicates that the Railroad is rele-
gated to its common law rights. The fact that Con-
gress might have the power to compel state courts 
to abdicate their common law jurisdiction in certain 
fields is moot and academic. In reality, Congress 
has not attempted to do so. As appellant pointed. out, 
the powers of a state court are pre-empted by fed-
eral legislation only when the enactment in question 
so states ( Applt's br. p. 20). 
The very authorities cited by respondent show 
that the doctrine of prin1ary jurisdiction applies 
only where the agency is vested with jurisdiction by 
appropriate 'legislation. 
Thus, respondent quotes a United ·states Dis-
trict Court in Washington as stating· "The substance 
of the doctrine is that where by appropriate legisla-
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tion an administrative agency is vested with juris-
diction * * * ". (Respdt's br. p. 11, emphasis added, 
quoting from Ellison v. R~ayonier, Inc. 156 F. 'Supp. 
214 (W.D. Wash. 1957) ). ~n~ll~t_G~~-~ the .<!~ten­
dant llad_moved m .dismiss claiming that the Wash-
ington Water Pollution Control Act had vested _in 
~he~-~2~l.'l!i9!1. ,...Q()~tr<?·!, .. Commission. primary_ juris-. 
diction to determine stand.ards_of actionable.. pollu-: 
tion of state waters. The statutes cited in the de-
~-· -· -..-,_: ~~ -~....,.-~~:.. ,. 
c_ision s:b.:QW_ that the Com111ission _was expressly_ given 
pO,Y.f_r to control and prevent pollution and to adopt 
ru_les, _ r~g_11lations and standards, and g~ve it the 
pow~r- to_ n1ake determinations. There can be no 
question but that the Commission there had express 
jurisdiction over an alleged polluter. 
The Railroad appears to contend that because 
courts have restricted their jurisdiction over certain 
subject n1atter in cases where 'the Interstate Com-
merce Commission was given (by express act of 
Congress) concurrent jurisdiction over the person 
requesting a referral, whenever such subject 
matter is involved 'the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission has "exclusive" jurisdiction over the parties 
as well. This is a non sequitur. A trial court might 
well feel that a complex question of international 
law before it would more properly be subject matter 
to be submitted 'to the International Court of Justice 
at the Hague and the Justices there migh't relish 
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the opportunity to be of assistance. But unless there 
were jurisdictional grounds by which a party could 
be compelled to appear before that court (or both 
parties submitted to that jurisdiction) a court order 
sending them there would \be a nullity. 
Respondent has failed to cite one case where 
a state court has referred a matter to a federal 
administrative agency over the objection of the de-
fendant shipper. It cites a very recent United States 
District ~court decision where the judge in an opi-
nion "hastily prepared without opportunity for con-
templative consideration of language or exhaustive 
review and citation of authorities" (United States 
v. Canfield Driveaw~ay Co., 159 F. Supp. 448 at 449, 
(E.D. Mich., S.D. 1958)) at least shows awareness 
of the dilemma he 'is in. 
He states: 
''In this case, however, it is the carrier 
whose charges have been paid in full, who 
insists that a reference be made. The court 
cannot find a spelling out of procedure wh-ere-
by a carrier situated as the defendant in this 
case, would initiate a proceeding before the_ 
Interstate Commerce Commissio11. I do not 
find any decided case in which tl1e application 
of the doctrine of prin1ary jurisdiction applies, 
wi'th the procedural background of the case at 
Bar." Id., at 4155. 
He further s'tates: 
"Ordinarily, such an investig·ation would 
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have its beginning in a complaint by a shipper 
claiming to have been overcharged. In the 
case of United St'mtes v. Western Pacific and 
United States v. Ches,ape,ake & Ohio R. ~Co., 
the party seeking a referral was the shipper, 
the Uni'ted States Government. In the case at 
Bar, the party seeking for a referral is the 
carrier, who in this litigation claims its 
charges were valid. No case has been ci'ted 
to the Court wherein the precise procedure to 
be employed in making such a referral is an-
nounced. However, inasmuch as defendant is 
here asking for such a referral, the burden of 
initiating the procedure to invoke the aid of 
the Interstate Commerce ·Commission would 
be upon it." Id., at 456. 
The floundering of the learned trial judge where 
he was admittedly acting without precedent, is hard-
ly clear or convincing authority for the propriety 
of his action. Moreover, this was a case where the 
defendant, not 'the party instituting the original 
action, asked for the referral. 'The only other case 
cited !by respondent on this point is Northern Pac. 
Ry. 'Co. v. United States, 213 F. 2d 366, ( CCA-8, 
1954) where the question of the federal ·court's jur-
isdictional power to refer is not even discussed. 
A more recent case not cited 'by respondent is 
New York, Susquehanna & W.estern R. Co. v. 
Follmer, 254 F. 2d 510, (CCA-3, 1958). 'This was 
an action between two carriers dealing wi'th divi-
sion of receipts from joint through rates established 
by agreement. The defendant carrier requested and 
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obtained referral to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. /The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit reversed the trial judge and ordered 
the order of referral vacated. In that case the carrier 
objecting to referral cited the opinion of Mr. Justice 
Jackson wherein he said: 
''If the court is presented with a case it 
can decide but some issue is within the com-
petence of an administrative body, in an inde-
pendent proceeding, to decide, comity and 
avoidance of conflict as well as other consider-
ations make it proper to refer that issue. But 
we know of no case where the court has order-
ed r.efer:ence of an issue which the ttdministra-
tive body would not itself have jurisdiction w 
determine in a proceeding for that purpose." 
Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., v. Northwest-
ern Publ. Serv. ·Co. 341 US 246, 254, 71 Sup. 
Ct. 692, 696, 95 L. Ed. 912 (1951). (empha-
sis added) 
As the carrier seeking referral, according to the 
court, had '''come up with some ingenious arguments 
in support of a view that the Commission does have 
original jurisdiction in these matters'' the court 
preferred not to rest its decision upon this ground. 
I d. 
But if this court does find that the commerce 
clause of the United States Constitution does not, of 
itself, give the Interstate Commerce Commission 
original juris-diction of these cases (this being the 
sole argument upon which the railroad relies for 
10 
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such jurisdiction) then it should follow the conclu-
sion of Mr. Justice Jackson and hold referral im-
proper. 
If the commission had no concurrent initial 
jurisdiction then the sole basis for a referral would 
be as an accommodation to the Utah court, analogous 
to the situation of referral to a master. The Appel-
lant in its original brief discussed at length the un-
desirability of, and inability of the state court to 
make, such referral on this ground. It is significant 
to note that the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit in the Follmer case supra agreed wi'th appel-
lant's analogy 'to the case of referral to a master. 
That ·court discusses LaBuy v. Howes £,eather Co., 
352 US 249, 77 Sup. Ct. 309, 1 L. Ed. '2d 2·90 ( 1957), 
and then says : 
"'That case also emphasizes strongly the 
point of view that references to masterships, 
although provided for by the federal rules, 
should be very sparingly used by district 
judges. ·see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. rule 
53 (b), 28 U;S.C. See also United States v. 
Kirkpatrick, 3 Cir., 1951, 186 F.2d 393. We 
believe that the same attitude should be taken 
towards referrals to administrative agencies." 
POIN'T III. 
'THE IN·TERS·T~T'E COMMERCE COMMISSIO·N 
DOE'S N·OT HAVE PRIMARY JURISDI'CTION ·OVER 
'THE S·UBJECT MA'T'TER. 
Respondent inserted as an appendix the tariff 
in dispute in this action, as if to ask whe'ther any 
11 
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judge in his right mind would want to wrestle with 
such a verbal monster. 
The railroad contends that because some of the 
words in this monstrosity have a "peculiar meaning" 
that for this reason alone the matter should be re-
ferred to the Interstate Commerce Commission. This 
contention completely ignores the holding of the 
United States ·supreme Court in the Western Pacific 
case, which is the latest and most definitive develop-
ment of the doctrine. There the court said: 
''We say merely that where, as here, th£ 
problem of cost-allocation is relevent, and 
where therefore the questions of construction 
and reasonableness are so intertwined that 
the same factors are determinative on both 
issues, that it is the Commission which must 
first pass on them". United States v. Western 
Pac. R. Co., 352 u·s 59, 69, 77 Sup. Ct. 161, 
1 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1956) (emphasis added). 
This is 'the ratio decidendi of that case. There 
is no statement here as to words with a "peculiar 
meaning''. Courts decide contract actions where 
words have "peculiar meanings" every day of the 
year. If a railroad could always avoid judicial con-
struction of its tariffs 'by merely inserting words 
with a "peculiar meaning" tariffs would rapidly 
assume even greater incomprehensibility than they 
do now. 'This would be an invitation to obfuscation. 
In fact the Follmer opinion is helpful here. 'That 
Court of Appeals stated: 
12 
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'''This second issue seems to us to be a 
question of construing the contract the parties 
have made, deciding whether there has been 
a breach and whether any rights have been 
waived or otherwise lost. The terms used seem 
to us to provide no more technical difficuTties 
than a contract growing out of business in 
the textile industry or the purchase and .sale 
of produc'ts from a steel fabricating plant. 
Their interpretation is not intermixed with 
the peculiarly administrative function of de-
termining the reasonability of rates charged.'' 
New York, Susq. & Western R. ·Co. v. Follmer, 
supra, at 513. 
The reasonableness of rates or questions of clas-
sification which are necessarily intertwined with 
reasonableness of rates are matters for referral, as 
the Western Racific case properly held. But the rail-
road appears to contend that any questions which 
raise ''issues of transportation policy'' (Respdt's br. 
p. 36) should be referred. If this is the law th~n why 
the tortuous route that the United States Supreme 
Court has wended, carefully trying to fit each case 
into the pigeonhole of either Merchants Elev~ator or 
Ameriuan Tie? Both lines of authority involve ''is-
sues of transportation policy". But 'the test is not 
such vagueness. It is whether the interpretation of 
the tariff involves problems of cost-allocation. ·The 
record here is utterly devoid of any evidence that 
'the issues in these cases involve problems of cost-
allocation. 
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POINT IV. 
REFERRAL TO THE INTERiS'TATE COMMER'CE 
COMMlSSION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
The railroad raises the question of the possible 
bar of a referral by the Statute of Limitations. 
( Respdt' s hr. p. 34-35) . This issue was raised in 
the Western Pacific case, the Supreme Court point-
ing out tha't ·section 16 (3) (a) of the Interstate 
Commerce Act "makes it clear that where a carrier 
sues a private shipper, the action must be brought 
within two years". United States v. Western Pac. 
R. Co., supra, at 70. But, that court points out, as 
the shipper in that case was the United States, the 
six year statute of the Tucker Act would apply 
(which statute would not be applicable here). The 
Court held 'that the suits themselves were timely 
brought and addressed itself to the question of the 
effect of 'the statute on a referral. 
~The Supreme Court is then faced with several 
cases construing Section 16 ( 3) as ''jurisdictional". 
( I't should be recalled that in Western Pacific it was 
the government, the shipper-defendant, who request-
ed the referral.) The court distinguished them as 
follows: 
"The teaching of the Midstate Case (Mid-
state Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 
320 U'S 356, 88 L. Ed. 96, 64 S. Ct. 128) for 
instance, is that the running of the statute 
14 
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destroys the right to affirmative recovery as 
well as the remedy, so the period of limita-
tions cannot be waived hy the parties. But 
here the government is not asserting a right 
'to affirmative recovery. It is seeking only 
to have adjudicated questions rais.ed by way 
of defense." United States v. Western Pac. R. 
Go., supr,a, at 7~2-73 (emphasis added). 
The court next discusses Morrisdale Coal~Co. v. 
Pe'f~nsylv1wnia R. Co., 230 U'S 304, 57 L. Ed. 1494, 
33 Sup. Ct. 938 ( 1913), where a shipper sued a 
carrier. The Court there held that the case raised 
issues cognizable only by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. The court in W.estern Pacific then sum-
marized the ruling in Morris~ale as follows : 
''* * * the Court held that the statute 
could not be evaded by filing suit in the Dis-
trict Court, rather than before the Commis-
sion, and then having the barred claim adjudi-
cated by referral to the latter. In effect the 
holding was that the plaintiff had evoked the 
wrong tribunal, and that since lim1ta'tions 
barred suit before the correct tribunal, no re-
ferral could be made to the latter." Uni.ted 
States v. Western AQ)c. R. Co., supra at 73. 
The court in Western Pacific dis'tinguis·hed 
Morrisdale as not barring "referral of defenses 
properly and timely brought". ld. The court then 
said "We hold, therefore, that the limitation of Sec-
tion 16 ('3) does not bar a reference to the Inter-
state Commerce Commission of questions raised by 
w,ay of defens.e and within the Commission's primary 
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jurisdiction, as were these questions relating to the 
applica'ble tariff". Id., at 74. (emphasis added) 
It is strongly urged that the facts by which the 
Morrisdale case were distinguished in Western Pa-
cific are not before this court. In the instant cases, 
the railroad sought to commence its actions in the 
Utah courts, in many instances only a few days 
before the two year statute of limitations ran, as 
shown from the face of the pleadings. Then over a 
year after the cases were at issue the railroad-plain-
tiff decided to ask for referral. This clearly is not 
a case of "reference to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission of questions raised by way of defense". 
These are questions which form the very basis of 
its right of affirmative relief. The railroad by its 
own characterization of the issues as being properly 
within the Commission's primary exclusive jurisdic-
tion, has conceded it chose the wrong forum. It can-
not use the Utah court as an ins'trumentality to pre-
vent the running of the applicable statute of limi-
tations. 
POINT V. 
~SSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE INTERSTATE 
COMMER,CE COMMISSION DOES HAVE EXCLUSIVE 
PRIMARY JURISDIC'TION, THEN THE TRIAL COURT 
SH'OULD HAVE DISMISSED THESE CASES. 
The railroad contends that "once the determin-
a'tion is made that the agency should make the deci-
sion of certain questions, its jurisdiction is exclusive" 
16 
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(Respdt's br. p. 16). Assuming arguendo the vali-
dity of the argument, then the trial court should 
have dismissed the case. 
A case cited by the railroad, although n~dt on 
this point, bears directly on this issue. In United 
States v. Appic,ell~a, 148 F. Supp. 457, (D., N.J. 
1957), the Court of Appeals for the 1Third Circuit 
had vacated a judgment in favor of the government 
in view of the deci8ion in Western Pacific. The ques-
tion before the trial judge was whether the action 
should be dismissed or retained pending referral. 
The court made a thorough and helpful analysis 
of the cases. It quoted from the American Tie case 
where 'the court said "It results that error was com-
mitted by the court in declining to sustain the mo-
tion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction and there-
fore it is our duty to reverse", Texas & Pacific Ry. 
Co. v. Amerioan Tie and Timber Co., 2'34 US 138, 
149, 34 Sup. Ct. 885, 58 L. Ed. 1255 (1914). 
It qudted from United States v. Interstate Com-
merce Commissi'Jn 337 US 426, 4~37, 69 Sup. Ct. 
1410,1417,93 L. Ed. 1451 (1949). "Butithasbeen 
established doctrine since this Court's holding in 
Texas & Pacific Ry. ~Co. v. Abilene Cotton & Oil Go., 
[citing] that a shipper cl(lnnot file a section 9 pro-
ceeding in a district court where his claim for dam-
ages necessarily involves a ques'tion of 'reasonable-
17 
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. . ' . 
ness' calling for exercise of the Commission s pri-
mary jurisdiction {emphasis supplied)''. The trial 
Judge pointed out that in Far Eastern Conference 
v. United States, 34·2 u~s 570, 72 Sup. Ct. 492, 96 
L. Ed. 576 (1952), the Supreme Court held the com-
plaint should be dismissed and not held in abey-
ance by the District Court. 
The trial judge o·bserved that the government's 
effort ·to have the court retain jurisdiction was based 
upon a fear generated from the Western Pacific 
case. 
"In short, the United States realizes that 
the statutory limitation on bringing a com-
plaint to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion would 'bar recourse to that body. But this 
is no reason for this court to retain a cause 
over which it has no jurisdiction in the first 
place. The motion to dismiss is granted", 
United States v. Apicella, supra, at page 460. 
The railroad seeks to avoid this dilemma by 
con'tending that there are issues still within the gen-
eral jurisdiction of the state court (respdt's br. p. 
50). It cites for an example the awarding and en-
forcing of damages. But as the judge in the Apicella 
case pointed out, the questions referred to the Inter-
state Commerce Commission are not clearly sever-
able from the issue of liability for the alleged 
charges. There would be no undercharge if the com-
mission determined tha:t the defendant here was pro-
perly complying with the tariff. 
18 
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The possible running of a statute of limitations 
is not grounds for a stay as the Apicella case shows. 
Indeed the Western Pacific court must have agreed, 
for it spent considerable space in its opinion point-
ing out that the statute did not bar reference of ques-
tions ra'ised in defense, a problem which could have 
been easily overcome by merely staying proceeding 
in the trial oourt pending referral, if it felt that 
this would be possi1ble. 
An additional reason for dismissal becomes ap~ 
parent when respondent in its brief finally makes 
clear its understanding of the procedure ~o be fol-
lowed pursuant to the trial court's order. T'he rail-
road denies that the s'tate court ordered the Inter-~ 
state Commerce Commission to make a determina-
tion (Respdt's br. p. 34) * ·The railroad_ contends 
that a determination by the commission "would 
then be based on an independent petition by the 
respondent for a declaratory order pursuant to ·sec-
tion 5 (d) of the Administrative Procedure Act.'' 
But under the Federal Administrative Proce-
dure Act review lies exclusive through the Federal 
courts ( 5 US'CA § 1001 et seq.) . 
Moreover by express federal statute, procedure 
is established for en£orcemen't, injunction, annul-
ment or setting aside of orders of the Interstate 
* Despite the fact that the order recites "it is further ?rde.red tha~ 
the Commission make such further report and determination ... 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Commerce Commission in the United States Dis-
trict Courts. As the United ·states Supreme ·Court 
has stated, "Federal District Courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction of suits to enjoin, set aside, annul or 
, suspend an order of the commission. In such suits 
the United States is an indispensable party." Sea-
board Airline R. Co. v. Daniel, 3'33 u·s 118, 122, 92 
L. Ed. 580,585,68 Sup. Ct. 426 (1948). 
Thus it is clear that the matter is not as simple 
as stated by the railroad (e.g. ''Thus both finding of 
fact and conclusion of law would be returned to the 
trial court") ('Respdt's :br. p. 48). Any review of the 
Commission's finding must proceed through the 
federal court system. This points up the dual incon-
gruity of the railroad's argument. It seeks to have 
issues resolved by a federal commission which has 
no jurisdiction over defendants, and then asks that 
the findings be returned to a state court which has 
no jurisdiction to review them. These actions sl1ould 
be dismissed in any event to allow defendants full 
scope of review within the proper jurisdictional 
system. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MABEY, 
BILLING'S & STODDARD 
By Albert J. Colton 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Structural Steel & Forge Co. 
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